PSI TECH's Position On The A.I.R. Report
In 1994, congress directed the CIA to assume responsibility for the DIA's remote viewing program. The American Institutes For Research was tasked by the CIA to conduct an evaluation of remote viewing's effectiveness. The evaluation was headed by Jessica Utts, a statistician at the University of California, Davis and Ray Hyman, a skeptic and a professor at the University of Oregon.
The only material provided to the researchers for evaluation was work conducted by the personnel of STARGATE, the final incarnation of the government's remote viewing program, which was passed to CIA control in 1995.
STARGATE, however, bore no resemblance to its progenitor Army psychic spy unit, which operated as a classified entity for more than a decade (1977-1988) and was overseen by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The Army operational unit had been continuously employed, since 1978, in support of actual missions, first for DoD, later for the entire national intelligence community, particularly in cases where all other intelligence penetration attempts had failed, or were not available. GRILL FLAME, (which was listed in the INSCOM books as "Detachment G") had consisted of soldiers and a few civilians who possessed varying degrees of natural psychic ability. These operatives utilized altered states to achieve (varying degrees) of target contact.
In 1983, a brilliant psychic, under the direction of a physicist at SRI, developed an accurate model of how the collective unconscious communicates (target) information to conscious awareness. He believed that the ability to remote view, like language, is an innate faculty - a birthright - but must be learned to be effective. His model provided a rigid set of instructions which theoretically allowed anyone to actually be trained to produce accurate, detailed target data. To test the model, the Army sent six soldiers to him as a prototype trainee group.
The results were more than anyone had anticipated. In six months, the Army team members were producing psychically derived data with more consistency and accuracy than the most renown natural (untrained) psychics alive. Now designated CENTER LANE, the unit took a "lets see what this baby can do" approach, replacing the unit's former intelligence collection methodology with the breakthrough technique.
With the increased military rigor and discipline, combined with a team approach and countless hours of applying the new tool against a wide range of operational and training targets, the techniques became dependable enough to be used in support of life-or-death missions, or special operations in which the application of deadly (military) force was authorized.
In 1986, the Army passed the highly controversial unit to DIA. SUN STREAK (ferreted away in DIA's Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate as DT-S), was a bastard element. This is because DIA is an analytical agency - it has no charter to collect intelligence.
Because of this formal prohibition, the unit's focus shifted almost entirely to developing and teaching advanced remote viewing training techniques. Bust as a displaced operations unit, they began slipping in numerous operational missions right under the nose of the administrator, a civilian who had been assigned by DIA to administratively oversee the unit. The unit continued to go outside of authorized channels to pass "PSIINT" (psychic intelligence) to former clients in the intelligence community and classified research community, particularly to Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Biological Threat Analysis Center (which PSI TECH's founder had helped to establish during a prior assignment, by supplying the U.S. President and NSC with proof that the Soviets had clandestinely developed a new generation of biochemical warfare agents).
By 1989, the civilian adminstrator had replaced all of the trained military professionals with psychics virtually taken "off the street," thus rendering the project ineffective for intelligence collection purposes - but highly entertaining for certain civilian officials who came to visit DIA's "witches" to obtain personal psychic "readings."
STARGATE, evaluated by A.I.R., consisted of three individuals, only one of which was a partially trained military remote viewer. The other two individuals, one a former secretary, were tarot card readers and channelers, employed by DIA since 1987. Nothing of value or significance occured in this unit from 1991 until 1994. The lack of military training, discipline and control which had been present in the Army's psychic spy unit lead STARGATE to be a complete failure.
During this time period, PSI TECH, Inc., which had been established in 1989 and employed the best and brightest of the former military trained remote viewers, continued to be tasked against targets through official channels in the D.I.A. and the U.S. intelligence community.
The A.I.R. researchers were nto provided access to the more than a decade of operational work performed by the trained remote viewers in the Army's psychic spy unit. Through his limited contact with the unclassified research, Ray Hyman unwittingly became a "Judas Goat," helping to keep the Soviets (and, for operational security reasons, the American taxpayers), in the dark about both the existence of the Army's unit and, more importantly, its effectiveness.
The AIR report fails to provide an accurate assessment of remote viewing as an intelligence collection tool. At best, it provides some insight into the failed methods and operational capability of the three members of "STARGATE," but it ignores the vast majority of the years historic remote viewing data provided by trained military remote viewers in the Army and DIA remote viewing program tht was utilized in support of actual missions, and which remains classified as of this writing.
Original Documents:
A.I.R. Report Executive Summary
The following document is the executive summary issued by The American Institutes For Research.
